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Abstract:
It is often said that there are three great traditions of
normative ethics: consequentialism, deontology, and virtue
ethics. Each is based around a compelling intuition about
the nature of ethics: that what is ultimately important is
that we produce the best possible outcome, that ethics is
a system of rules which govern our behaviour, and that ethics
is about living a life that instantiates the virtues, such
as honesty, compassion and loyalty. This essay is about how
best to interpret consequentialism. I show that if we take
consequentialism beyond the assessment of acts, using a consequentialist
criterion to assess decision making, motivation, and character,
then the resulting theory can also capture many of the intuitions
about systems of moral rules and excellences of character
that lead people to deontology and virtue ethics.
I begin by considering the argument that consequentialism
is self-defeating because its adoption would produce bad outcomes.
I take up the response offered by the classical utilitarians:
when properly construed, consequentialism does not require
us to make our decisions by a form of naïve calculation,
or to be motivated purely by universal benevolence. Instead
it requires us to use the decision procedure that will produce
the best outcome and to have the motives that lead to the
best outcome. I take this idea as my starting point, and spend
the thesis developing it and considering its implications.
I demonstrate that neither act-consequentialism nor rule-consequentialism
has the resources to adequately assess decision making and
motivation. I therefore turn to the idea of global consequentialism,
which assesses everything in terms of its consequences. I
then spend the greater part of the essay exploring how best
to set up such a theory and how best to apply it to decision
making and motivation. I overcome some important objections
to the approach, and conclude by showing how the resulting
approach to consequentialism helps to bridge the divide between
the three traditions.
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